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Abstract—Peer-to-peer networks have gained a signiﬁcant
amount of popularity since their inception, being used in a
wide variety of contexts; both legal and illegal. The demand
for monitoring techniques able to analyse performance, identify
copyright infringers and detect the presence of peer-to-peer
trafﬁc on networks has similarly risen. Along with them ethical
issues have surfaced, awareness of which is essential when
planning research requiring peer-to-peer monitoring. This paper
discusses the collection of data through the monitoring of peer-to-
peer networks and identiﬁes areas of particular ethical concern
in its use.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer networks constitute a signiﬁcant amount of
Internet trafﬁc present on today’s networking infrastructure
[1], with a number of different uses across personal, business
and academic ﬁelds. Interest in peer-to-peer and the behaviour
of peers participating in these networks is leading to an
increased desire for techniques that can accurately monitor
these communications for a variety of reasons: legal, academic,
and analytical.
Although peer-to-peer networks tend to suffer from stereo-
types relating them wholly to illegal activity, there are a
number of legitimate and beneﬁcial uses for the architecture,
particularly in the domain of content distribution. Several
other uses such as distributed computing, collaboration and
distributed databases all favour peer-to-peer due to its highly
scalable and redundant properties [2].
Data collected by monitoring techniques could be used for
unintended purposes, requiring the careful design of research
studies in this area. Like all research involving data collec-
tion from uninformed participants, issues that present ethical
dilemmas for researchers arise [3].
This paper motivated by the fact that, while a signiﬁcant
amount of research has been conducted on the ethics behind
peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing [4], [5], [6], little has been established
regarding the ethics of monitoring peer-to-peer networks. It
is hoped that with increased awareness of the various issues
present in monitoring methods and the possible consequences
of improperly safeguarding data collected during this monitor-
ing, some measure of caution will be applied to investigations
in the area.
Section II begins with a summary of peer-to-peer networks
and their applications, then describes a subset of techniques
used to monitor peer-to-peer networks and participating users.
Section III describes the various approaches to Peer-to-Peer
monitoring. In Section IV the paper discusses the ethical im-
plications of researching and performing peer-to-peer network
monitoring. Section V discusses these issues in the context of a
case study of the monitoring of several Peer-to-Peer protocols.
Finally, Section VI presents some conclusions.
II. PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is a style of network architecture in
which participants each share a part of their resources (storage
capacity, bandwidth, processing power, etc.) for the purpose
of operating in collaboration to achieve a speciﬁc task. Each
node in the network should be capable of supplying services
or content directly with other nodes, without communications
being required to pass through intermediary servers [7]. Net-
work membership in a P2P network is ad-hoc and dynamic,
with peers playing the roles of both resource providers and
consumers - often simultaneously.
In contrast to more traditional client-server architectures,
P2P distributes information directly amongst participants
rather than concentrating information in a centralised server
cluster. Therefore, when a peer desires information from the
network it must initiate any communications that take place
by locating nodes that have desired data available and sending
a request. This differs from client-server, in which a client is
able to simply query the central server for any desired data.
A. Operation
P2P networking was developed to address certain short-
comings of existing networking architectures in speciﬁc cir-
cumstances; particularly content distribution, which tradition-
ally required a one-to-one connection (and all bandwidth
attributable) between every client and the server, represented in
Fig. 1a. In doing this, massive upstream bandwidth was needed
by the server in order to complete ﬁle requests in a timely
fashion, and user-side upstream was only minimally used. In
order to simultaneously reduce strain on dedicated servers and
utilise user-side upstream, the P2P architecture was proposed
has been effectively used in a number of internet protocols
ranging from ﬁle transfers to distributed computing [8].
Unlike the client-server architecture which establishes a
virtual connection between server and client on which to
transfer data, P2P networks operate in a swarm of clients;
as seen in Fig. 1b, each user becomes a node in a cloud of
users. In order to effectively co-ordinate nodes, some level
of hybridisation usually exists; for example, BitTorrent uses(a) Client-Server (b) Peer-to-Peer
Fig. 1. Internet Architectures
.torrent ﬁles stored on web servers and Folding@Home uses
dedicated servers to assign workloads. It is worth noting that
some of these procotols have often been entirely decentralised
and puriﬁed through various methods due to the legal threat an
unauthorised index ﬁle hosted on a server can pose. Napster
was considered a hybrid P2P protocol that used centralised
servers for ﬁle indexing and search purposes, making those
servers (and their owners) a primary target for anti-piracy
lawsuits [9] and Distributed Denial of Service attacks - a
problem generally not faced by fully-decentralised systems,
as publishers or assailants would have to pursue individuals.
B. Applications
Peer-to-peer networks, whilst frequently envisioned as only
used for ﬁle-sharing, have a number of other uses that aim to
leverage their highly redundant, scalable nature; an attribute
attractive to a number of system architectures. A survey by
Androutsellis-Theotokis [2] provides some indication of how
widespread possible applications for peer-to-peer are: Voice
over IP [10], resource discovery for grid computing [11],
video streaming [12], ﬁle-sharing [13], web portal systems
such as Osiris [14] and social communications systems such
as Diaspora [15]. Of particular interest to this paper is the use
of P2P networking for ﬁle-sharing.
File-sharing networks represent a signiﬁcant portion of P2P
networks in use, with P2P ﬁles-sharing being considered to
make up approximately 50 percent of all Internet trafﬁc [16].
This ﬁle-sharing is done over a variety of different P2P proto-
cols (e.g. BitTorrent, Gnutella, eDonkey, Ares), which usually
differ slightly in terms of architecture and communication
format, but operate on a set of base principles; primarily, each
peer in a swarm maintains a set of local ﬁles and associated
meta-data for the purpose of content distribution to other peers
within the swarm.
P2P networks are particularly well-suited to ﬁle-sharing
and content distribution due to several inherent attributes;
redundancy, speed of distribution, cost and availability [17].
Due to their highly dynamic nature, P2P networks are almost
completely redundant; the network only degrades once ﬁle
availability decreases to below 100 percent, which in turn only
occurs when no remaining peer contains a complete copy of
the ﬁle [13]. As long as a single seed remains, the ﬁle is still
available for distribution.
As a result of its highly-distributed nature, P2P also encour-
ages substantial increases in distribution speed when compared
to client-server [18], as every peer is able to distribute pieces of
data to any node that does not yet have the complete ﬁle. The
use of peer upstream bandwidth to distribute data also reduces
the bandwidth use of the initial content provider, lowering
related costs.
One of the ways in which routing and availability in-
formation was decentralised in ﬁle-sharing networks was to
correctly utilise Distributed Hash Tables [19] - a method of
distributing ﬁle availability and routing information over a
swarm of users. There are a number of DHT algorithms in
use by ﬁle-sharing systems such as Bittorrent [20], as well
as Content-Addressable Networks [21] and others, as detailed
by Androutsellis-Theotokis [2]. Hashes are generated for ﬁles
being shared and mapped to nodes, then distributed over the
user cloud so that all available ﬁles can be located by querying
nodes. Users that wish to join the swarm are usually directed
there by a specially-crafted hypertext link, such as a Magnet
URIs. As nodes join and leave the swarm the hash tables are
redistributed to retain availability, and any node that wishes
to download a piece of the available ﬁles can progressively
query nodes in the table for a node ID to retrieve the piece
from [22]. By contrast, Napster had a centralised search server
that would keep an index of nodes and ﬁle availability [23],
and peers would directly query the search servers in order to
determine ﬁle piece location (though the transfers themselves
were still peer-to-peer).
Peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing is not limited to unauthorised distri-
bution of copyrighted content - a number of large organisations
are utilising peer-to-peer for the purpose of content distribution
when ﬁle demand reaches high levels. A prime example of
this is Blizzard Inc., who now use a BitTorrent-based system
to distribute patches for their software. Due to the extremely
large quantity of users (approximately 11.4 million for World
of Warcraft alone [24]) that require access to patches in order
to play online, new methods of ﬁle delivery were trialled
in order to ﬁnd a more scalable technology that could cope
with the amount of requests. In the end, a proprietary client
leveraging BitTorrent as a distribution protocol was selected
and is currently being used to distribute patches for all recent
Blizzard games.
C. Anonymity
Anonymity can be difﬁcult to achieve when creating con-
nections over the internet, as there is no way to transfer
data without some kind of point-to-point connection existing.
Trusted intermediate proxy servers can be used to prevent a
direct connection from peer to peer, but these servers present
a form of centralisation that can be taken advantage of to
identify users [25]; as well as a signiﬁcant expense to users
due to an increase in bandwidth quota utilisation.
Anonymous pure peer-to-peer connections are possible un-
der certain circumstances, but are relatively rare due to a
reliance on multicast connections that tend to be unavailable
on the majority of remote networks without the intervention of
internet service providers (who are unlikely to provide such
a service). One possible way of allowing anonymous peer-
to-peer connections is through use of Onion Routing [26], atechnique that involves the passing of requests between peers
in a chain. Each link in the chain is unable to determine
whether the request originated from the node before it or
whether it is another link in the chain, so the request remains
essentially anonymous. However, this approach can result in
compromised anonymity if attackers perform a prolonged at-
tack [27]. To counter this strategy, a method of ﬁle-sharing in-
volving only unicast (point-to-point) connections was designed
to allow anonymous peer-to-peer connections and transfers to
take place. This approach has two disadvantages, however;
if multicast connections are not utilised, there must be an
untrusted proxy to initialise the sharing session that represents
a single point of failure, and transfer speeds are degraded
signiﬁcantly due to the extra transfers between peers required
[27].
Identiﬁcation of a user in any network is usually only able to
be traced as far as the user’s nearest router (generally a home
router), as any addresses identiﬁed only show that a particular
router was used to access information, and rarely includes any
particular details on which speciﬁc device or user accessed the
information. Extensive auditing protocols are required to be
able to determine precisely which user was accessing speciﬁc
data at any time and are still sometimes unreliable [28]. The
use of public wireless access points is a particular problem for
user identiﬁcation, as it generally becomes impossible to prove
that a speciﬁc user was accessing information at a certain time
[28].
III. PEER-TO-PEER MONITORING
A. Rationale
Monitoring of peer-to-peer networks can be accomplished
for a variety of reasons; copyright enforcement [28], general
research purposes [29], cost/beneﬁt analyses and discovery of
peer-to-peer presence [30] are some examples of relatively
common monitoring rationales.
 Copyright Enforcement: One of the primary reasons
to monitor peer-to-peer networks is for the purpose of
copyright enforcement. Often contracting to specialised
companies, copyright owners direct their resources into
directly monitoring and identifying the IP addresses of
users on swarms that share ﬁles owned by the organi-
sation. Once a list of infringing IP addresses has been
compiled, the organisation has a number of options:
notifying the users’ ISPs that infringement has taken
place and letting the ISP handle it, subpoenaing the ISP
with warrants requesting user identiﬁcation and taking
their own action, or sending infringement notices directly
to the user, often with a settlement notice. However, this
process encounters problems stemming from potential
inaccuracies in user identiﬁcation below the router level
(See Section II-C) [28].
 General Research Purposes: Monitoring of P2P net-
works can reveal interesting details about peers in a
swarm such as statistical data (e.g. average speeds),
geographical location, and the behaviour of peers, such
as their habits with regards to sharing information [29]
[30]. Similar studies are also useful in establishing the
efﬁciency and performance of newly-designed protocols.
 Beneﬁt Analyses: Companies planning on utilising P2P
technology have reason to conduct a cost/beneﬁt analysis
on a test platform. In this case monitoring would be
performed on the network to determine beneﬁts derived
from using peer communications over traditional client-
server architectures.
 P2P Presence and Security: Peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing
networks operating within organisational networks can be
problematic for a number of reasons. Employees utilis-
ing P2P ﬁle-sharing networks can create degradation of
network performance, security threats like the accidental
sharing of conﬁdential data [29], and legal issues. As one
study discovered, an estimated 3-4 percent of Gnutella
trafﬁc was attributed to business networks [30].
B. Monitoring Methods
Peer-to-peer monitoring and tracing commences with trafﬁc
categorisation at a number of possible levels. Three primary
levels are deﬁned as network-level, passive application-level
and active application-level [1]; each providing beneﬁts and
shortcomings depending on the speciﬁc situation they are
utilised in.
 Network-level: Examines trafﬁc at a packet level and
identiﬁes P2P trafﬁc by matching packets with the known
characteristics of various P2P systems. Deep Packet
Inspection can be deployed at this level, though real-
time processing can be strenuous for processing servers
depending on volume bandwidth passing through [31];
the majority of studies are not likely to require real-time
analysis, however. The trace is relatively transparent, but
requires network access in order to deploy it effectively.
 Passive application-level: Operates by running a mod-
iﬁed P2P client and logging any routing information
and/or ﬁle requests that are communicated with the client.
Also considered relatively transparent, a passive client
does not require administrative network access - however,
useful data gathering is limited.
 Active application-level: Similar to passive monitoring,
active monitoring also involves running a modiﬁed P2P
client on an existing swarm and logging any routing
and connection information. The key contrast lies in the
activity of the application; an active trace will proactively
seek out and discover peers and the resources they
contain. As such, the data gathered is extremely plentiful
and useful - but the client is extremely visible, which may
be undesirable for some purposes.
Additionally, difﬁculties with monitoring are omnipresent
- identifying peer-to-peer trafﬁc can be difﬁcult if it is en-
crypted, and thorough methods of data analysis such as Deep
Packet Inspection can quickly become overloaded or result in
severe performance degradation if extremely large amounts
of incoming data need to be analysed in real time. The
presence of monitoring agents in a peer-to-peer swarm canalso be discovered when using active monitoring, which can be
undesirable [28], [32]. Regardless, the monitoring of peer-to-
peer networks can still provide interesting and valuable results
for academic purposes.
IV. ETHICAL ISSUES
During the course of monitoring a peer-to-peer network,
several ethical issues can be encountered; though these tend
to vary depending on research purpose and the network
involved. For example, ethical issues with monitoring live ﬁle-
sharing networks tend to be related to the legality of content
being shared, whereas monitoring peer-to-peer communica-
tions networks could reveal private details about individuals.
Without consent supplied by individuals who participate in
the networks under observation, users’ privacy is solely under
the protection of the researcher [33]. It is important to note
that obtaining consent in the ﬁrst place is extremely difﬁcult,
as gathering valid usert identities and contact information is
problematic at best.
Marx [34] presents a framework for evaluating surveillance
techniques from an ethical perspective that emphasises the
responsibility of the observer to avoid harm to individuals
being monitored. The framework is almost wholly applicable
to evaluating the ethics of peer-to-peer monitoring, due to
similarities in methodology and sample groups. This frame-
work proposes three possible sources of ethical issues in a
surveillance context, brieﬂy described below through a non-
exhaustive set of associated questions:
 The Means: Can the collection technique cause harm?
Does the technique break the trust of the subject?
 The Data Collection Context: Are the participants aware
of the monitoring? Was a consent form signed?
 Uses: What is the data being used for? Could this use
cause harm to the subject?
A. The Means
Given the relative passivity of P2P monitoring techniques
(See Section III-B), and the fact that none of these are
performed in the physically, it is unlikely that ethical concerns
relating to the physical wellbeing of the subjects could be
triggered by the monitoring itself.
Issues of service degradation are more topical, as demon-
strated by the attempts made by a number of Internet service
providers to use peer-to-peer presence sensing technology
so as to throttle peer connections. The use of this monitor-
ing in order to degrade user experience, dictated solely by
the presence of P2P trafﬁc on a connection has been met
with resistance. Indeed, the few Internet service providers
who implemented such throttling methods found they were
negatively impacting legitimate uses of P2P, resulting in a
public outcry of sufﬁcient size to force a reversion of policy
[35]. This brings the issue of invalidity to the fore; Can the
technique(s) used for monitoring produce invalid results? [34].
If the detection of P2P trafﬁc is so imprecise as to make it
impossible to differentiate legal from illegal uses, it surely is
unethical to arbitrarily disrupt all P2P trafﬁc on the off-chance
it might be illegal. In addition, from a copyright enforcement
perspective, proper identiﬁcation of peers in a P2P network
can be challenging (See Section II-C), and can lead to cases of
false identiﬁcation, which can then cause psychological harm
to the falsely accused. This makes invalidity a deﬁnite ethical
concern when performing this type of monitoring.
Some peer-to-peer protocols suffer from degraded
anonymity if monitoring is performed for sustained periods
of time [27]; with this in mind, if monitoring 100 users
behaviour for a week would result in a similar level of data
quality to monitoring 10 users for 10 weeks, it may be
worth using the former method: choosing the method that
guarantees increased anonymity is the most ethically sound
decision. Population and sample size must be taken into
account when designing potential alternatives, but devising
a more ethical solution with no or little loss in accuracy
would be considered more acceptable than a situation that is
potentially dangerous for users.
B. The Data Collection Context
From the outset, there are ethical issues arising from the
context of monitoring P2P networks. From a research perspec-
tive, involving users unaware of the ongoing monitoring could
be considered unethical; the decision hinging on whether users
participating in a network that is part of the public domain
actually have any right to privacy. It is not an unreasonable
assumption to expect users to realise their actions in publicly-
accessible communities may have a negative impact on their
own personal privacy - if they do not wish their behaviour
and actions to be monitored, they have the option of leaving
the network. It is entirely possible that, disregarding the difﬁ-
culties already highlighted relating to entering in contact with
participants of the P2P network, informing these participants
that monitoring is taking place could cause the data obtained
to lose its value, especially in cases where illegal activity is
being monitored. This once again leads researchers towards the
performance of an ethical balancing act, weighing the need for
accurate data versus proper participant awareness and consent.
In cases like these, where the ethical choice is not necessar-
ily clear cut, Marx asserts that answering a simple question can
provide a valuable look at whether or not a particular study is
ethical; Would those in charge of the monitoring agree to being
monitored in the same fashion? [34]. While more obviously
applied to more extreme forms of surveillance, differences in
ethical opinions between researchers and those under study
can vary substantially; users are not always as eager to be
participants to research as academics might like to assume. It
is worth considering any potential divergences in these points
of view.
C. Uses
Foremost amongst our ethical concern should be determin-
ing whether the data collected during monitoring could cause
physical or psychological harm when put to its intended use.
If data is collected from a live network that could include
copyright-infringing material, publishing that data could resultin the identiﬁcation of users - possibly leading to litigation.
Considering the extreme penalties that tend to be handed down
to infringers, successful litigation is likely to ensure signiﬁcant
psychological and ﬁnancial harm to the user - who likely never
gave their consent to begin with. This is an issue familiar
to criminologists, who have codes of ethics regarding the
divulging of data which could lead to repercussions on their
sources. For example, the British Society of Criminology’s
code of ethics clearly states that the safekeeping of the
participant’s physical, social and psychological wellbeing is
the responsibility of the researcher [36]. With this in mind,
all datasets should be anonymised prior to publication in
order to avoid harming the wellbeing of the participants.
This then raises other issues; What if the data required for
a study requires some measure of identity amongst users, or
it becomes worthless? Ensuring that data collected is only
used for its stated and intended purpose is paramount in
this case. The possibility of stored data intended for research
being transmitted to other parties and used to initiate litigation
against users is a real possibility if the data is not kept secured
and under the management of an ethical researcher.
As a rule, an ethically justiﬁable study should be able to
answer the following questions with the afﬁrmative [34]:
 Does this monitoring serve broad community goals?
 Have other ways to achieve similar ends, even if at a
higher cost, been considered but found insufﬁcient?
 Is the goal worth the cost (direct or collateral) of the
means?
 Is the information collected to be used to satisfy goals
other than the causing of harm or disadvantage to the
subjects?
V. MONITORING PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING
NETWORKS: A CASE STUDY
A. Overview
To investigate the issues highlighted in Section IV, a study
was performed by monitoring a number of different ﬁle-
sharing protocols at various times over the period of two years.
B. Collection
Because ﬁle-sharing protocols operate signiﬁcantly differ-
ently at a low-level (and some at a conceptual level), a solution
to parse each protocol was developed individually. Each script
has a similar objective; to record sightings of connections
from external addresses, as well as other metadata such as
the time seen, country of origin and ﬁle accessed. All network
addresses collected were anonymised after analysis, to prevent
storage of identifying data.
1) Gnutella: The Gnutella protocol takes advantage of
peers for use as routing nodes within the network. By po-
sitioning a modiﬁed client within a network, trafﬁc can easily
be monitored and logged for later use. After network addresses
are collected, they are compared to a predeﬁned database of
network owners to determine the suspected afﬁliation of the
device. The Gnutella network was monitored for the period of
one month, with 260,000 hits recorded.
2) BitTorrent: Unlike the Gnutella protocol, BitTorrent
monitoring requires an active scraping mechanism to seek out
torrents and determine peers connected. The scripts to handle
this activity are effectively in two components; the ﬁrst is a
torrent scraping program written for individual search indexes
that ﬁnds and retrieves torrent ﬁles, while the second accesses
the trackers listed in each collected torrent ﬁle and determines
seeds/peers for logging. To avoid polluting the resulting data,
the script host’s address is removed from the logs. A number
of the most popular BitTorrent trackers were scraped and
addresses monitored for a period of 15 months, with some
778 million hits recorded across 465,140 ﬁles.
3) OpenNap: Hearkening back to the earlier years of ﬁle-
sharing, the Napster protocol does not provide a list of
available ﬁles that can be scraped. Instead, a predeﬁned list
of search terms is used to actively seek out clients sharing
ﬁles. Once a peer is found, details are collected and logged
for future use. The OpenNap network was monitored for the
period of one month, with 3.1 million hits recorded.
4) Sopcast: SopCast conveniently provides a channel list
accessible in XML that can be parsed to determine content
and peers currently accessing the content. Addresses were then
queried for owner afﬁliation. SopCast was monitored for the
period of one month, with 434,000 hits recorded.
C. Discussion
A number of serious ethical issues come into play when
collecting sensitive data over a substantial period of time, as
this study did. The possible damage that could result from a
leak of a dataset of this type in the event of compromised
anonymity is catastrophic. A basic analysis of the dataset
collected suggests that, assuming the maximum penalty of
USD$30,000 per infringement, damages claimed by litigious
means could total an estimated USD$24 trillion. Despite
the absurdity of such a sum and the likelyhood that some
ﬁles are legitimate downloads or outside legal jurisdiction,
circumstances dictate that care is taken in collection and
anonymisation.
The data collected is not only useful to rights-holders - a
number of ethically-gray entities could use the information
contained within to coerce affected parties under the threat of
revealing related copyright infringement. As most enterprises
own whole IP address block allocations, removing the last
octet of an IP address will likely not anonymise the connec-
tion wholly, as even the truncated address is likely to fall
within a publically-listed subnet. It may be worth tracking
individual user sightings and one-way hashing their addresses,
which would maintain consistency of user connections while
eliminating the storage of addresses, avoiding many issues.
However, such an approach also removes the possibility of
some avenues of further analysis that depend on speciﬁc
network addresses, such as geographic or business mapping.
Avoiding infringement while monitoring these networks can
also be an issue. As part of the swarm, a modiﬁed peer will
still respond to other monitors that may be operating within the
network (such as those operated by rights-holders), althoughit is unnecessary to take any part of the ﬁle itself to retrieve
a list of peers that have made it available. This limits our
data retrieval from the swarm to merely meta-data, which
does not infringe copyright. With advances in decentralisation
techniques (such as peer exchange and DHT) there may be a
requirement for some part of the ﬁle to be accepted in order to
monitor peers - in such an instance, limiting data downloaded
to less than a single piece may avoid infringement depending
on local legislation.
It is important to note that data collected in this study
cannot be generalised to the whole internet population. By
actively scraping torrent index ﬁles from particular hosts in
a particular order, there is a recognisable pattern of torrents
being processed that could interfere with any complete anal-
ysis. In addition, ﬁrewalls such as PeerGuardian that prevent
connection to certain recognised hostile hosts could blacklist
any observers, limiting the population further. Care must be
taken when drawing generalising conclusions based on data
gathered with these techniques.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a number of key issues that should be
considered when designing studies involving the monitoring
of users participating in peer-to-peer networks, as well as an
overall summary of P2P applications and monitoring tech-
niques. Ethical issues include: compromised user anonymity,
difﬁculties with and impact of obtaining user consent, and
use or misuse of the data collected. Ensuring that one’s
experimental methodologies are designed to favour an ethical
approach should therefore be a priority before engaging in the
monitoring of peer-to-peer networks.
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